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College Is there  a methodology  of economic  policy  formulation?  It is understandable  that  the 
pressing  demands  of immediate  economic  challenges  should  normally  prevent  there  from  being 
great  amounts  of  attention  devoted  to  such  a meta-question.  Yet  certainly  the  discipline  could 
benefit  from  at least  some  systematic  reflection  on the  subject.  Nevertheless,  one  searches  in vain 
for  extended  treatments  or new  explorations  of economic  policy  innovation. 
The  work  of Adolph  Lowe  (1893-1995)  remains  an important  exception  in this  regard. 
Lowe’s  “instrumental  analysis”  is a greatly  overlooked  and  underexamined  alternative 
methodological  approach  to  economic  theory  and  public  policy.  Lowe’s  “instrumental  analysis”  is 
a greatly  overlooked  and  underexamined  alternative  methodological  approach  to  economic  theory 
and  public  policy.  Rather  than  taking  only  the  initial  conditions  as given  and  addressing  theory  to 
predicting  outcomes,  Lowe  proposed  also  taking  as given  a pre-determined  end-state:  a vision  of 
the  desired  outcomes.  The  task  then  becomes  the  derivation--the  discovery--of  the  technical  and 
social  path(s)  by which  those  outcomes  might  be achieved,  the  behavioral  and  motivational 
patterns  capable  of  setting  the  system  onto  a suitable  path,  the  environmental  context(s)  capable 
of  encouraging  or  inducing  these  patterns,  and  policies  shaping  or  creating  the  environmental 
contexts.  The  instrumental  method  is thus  a regressive  procedure,  beginning  from  where  we  want 
to  go  and  working  backwards  to  our  present  state,  or a state  within  our  present  reach  (Lowe, 
1977[ 19651, pp.  143-44).  Such  is the  role  for  economics:  not  determining  the  ends--the  macro 
goals--but  rather  contributing  to  the  discovery  and  actualization  of means  for  their  attainment. 
Lowe  briefly  mentions  in several  places  the  affinity  of his instrumentalism  with  certain 
ideas  of others.  In particular,  he  cites  the  pragmaticist  philosopher  Charles  Sanders  Pierce’s 
concept  of “retroduction”  (and  especially  Norwood  Hanson’s  elaborations  of that  concept),  the 
mathematician  George  Polya’s  work  on  heuristics,  and  physical  chemist  and  philosopher  of science  Michael  Polanyi’s  explorations  of “tacit  knowledge”  as all having  strong  areas  of kinship 
with  aspects  of his instrumentalism.  ’  These  references  are never  elaborated  or  explored  by Lowe, 
amounting  to  no  more  than  a sentence  or  a footnote  in most  cases.  In addition,  these  hints  have 
been  all but  entirely  overlooked  or ignored  in the  secondary  literature,  earning  only  a passing 
reference  from  Oakley  (1987,  p.  15), while  Hagemann  and  Kurz  (1990,  pp.  746-47)  at least 
follow-up  the  connection  to  Polya’s  work,  albeit  very  briefly  (one  paragraph). 
This  paper  will thus  attempt  an investigation  of the  relation  of these  concepts  to  Lowe’s 
instrumentalism.  It is hoped  that  an exploration  of these  ideas  will constitute  a first  step  in the 
project  of  evaluating  the  prospects  for  Lovian  Instrumentalism  contributing  to  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of effective  practical  policies  as we  enter  the  next  century.  It will also  be  argued 
that  such  an elaboration  of instrumentalism  is relevant  to  some  recent  discussions  concerning 
markets  and  planning  that  have  taken  place  in the  aftermath  of the  demise  of the  Soviet  Union,  in 
particular  the  new  Austrian  re-interpretation  of the  old  socialist  calculation  debate  in terms  of the 
‘knowledge  problem,’  and  attempts  to  formulate  a nonessentialist  approach  to  economic  policy 
and  planning. 
n 
Polya  devoted  much  work  to  heuristics,  whose  aim he  states  is to  “study  the  methods  and 
rules  of discovery  and  invention”  (1957[1945],  p.  112).  Central  to  heuristics  is the  regressive 
procedure  Polya  refers  to  as “working  backwards.”  Polya  notes  that  the  Greek  geometers,  who 
called  the  procedure  “analysis”  (meaning  “solution  backwards”  in Greek),  attributed  its discovery 
to  Plato  (Polya,  1984[ 19581, pp.  575-76).  Polya  has found  knowledge  and  use  of the  method  in 
’ See  Lowe,  1969,  pp.  183-84  and  n24;  1976,  p.  13nlS;  1977,  p. 332;  1992,  pp.  326-27. 
2 Euclid,  and  a remarkable  report  on  the  topic  by Pappus,  as well  as remarks  by Proclus 
(1984[  19711, p.  587).  Consider  Polya’s  translation  of a passage  from  the  seventh  book  of 
Pappus’  Collectiones  concerning  “analyomenos,” which  Polya  translates  as “Treasury  of 
Analysis,”  “Art  of  Solving  Problems,”  or “Heuristic”  (Polya,  1957[ 19451, p.  14 1): 
In  analysis,  we  start  from  what  is required,  we  take  it for  granted,  and  we  draw 
consequences  from  it, and  consequences  from  the  consequences,  till we  reach  a point  we 
can  use  as a starting  point  in synthesis.  For  in analysis,  we  assume  what  is required  to  be 
done  as already  done  (what  is sought  as already  found,  what  we  have  to  prove  as true). 
We  inquire  from  what  antecedent  the  desired  result  could  be derived;  then  we  inquire 
again  what  could  be the  antecedent  of that  antecedent,  and  so on,  until  passing  from 
antecedent  to  antecedent,  we  come  eventually  upon  something  already  known  or 
admittedly  true.  This  procedure  we  call analysis,  or  solution  backwards,  or  regressive 
reasoning  (ibid.,  p.  142). 
This  procedure  is contrasted  with  synthesis: 
[I]n  synthesis,  reversing  the  process,  we  start  from  the  point  which  we  reached  last  of all 
in the  analysis,  from  the  thing  already  known  or  admittedly  true.  We  derive  from  it what 
preceded  it in the  analysis,  and  go  on  making  derivations  until,  retracing  our  steps,  we 
finally  arrive  at what  is required.  This  procedure  we  call synthesis,  or  constructive 
solution,  or  progressive  reasoning  (ibid.). 
Polya  uses  an example  of a “primitive  man”  wishing  to  cross  a creek  to  demonstrate  both 
the  use  of the  regressive  procedure  in everyday  circumstances  as well  as to  elaborate  the  notions 
of “analysis”  and  “synthesis”  in a direction  quite  relevant  for  Lowe’s  instrumentalism.  Getting 
across  the  creek  is the  desired  end  result.  The  man  recalls  having  crossed  a creek  sometime 
before  by walking  along  a fallen  tree: 
He  looks  around  for  a suitable  fallen  tree  which  becomes  his new  unknown...  He  cannot 
find  any  suitable  fallen  tree  but  there  are  plenty  of trees  standing..  .; he wishes  that  one  of 
them  would  fall.  Could  he make  a tree  fall across  the  creek?  There  is a great  idea  and  a 
new  unknown;  by what  means  could  he tilt the  tree  over  the  creek?  This  train  of thought 
ought  to  be called  analysis  [in] the  terminology  of Pappus  (ibid., p.  145). 
After  stating  that  if the  “man  succeeds  in finishing  his analysis  he will be the  inventor  of the  bridge 
and  the  axe,”  Polya  then  asks  the  question:  “What  will be the  synthesis?”  (ihid.,  p.  145).  The 
3 answer  is crucial:  “Translation  of  the ideas  into  action.  The  finishing  act  of  synthesis  is walking 
along  a tree  across  the  creek”(ibid.,  p.  145, emphasis  added): 
The  same  objects  fill the  analysis  and  the  synthesis;.  .the  analysis  consists  in thoughts,  the 
synthesis  in acts.  There  is another  difference;  the  order  is reversed.  Walking  across  the 
creek  is the  first  desire  from  which  the  analysis  starts  and  it is the  last  act with  which  the 
synthesis  ends.. . Analysis  comes  naturally  first,  synthesis  afterwards;  analysis  is invention, 
synthesis,  execution;  analysis  is devising  a plan,  synthesis  carrying  through  the plan 
(ibid.,  pp.  145-46). 
Polya  cites  Hobbes: 
From  desire  ariseth  the  thought  of  some  means  we  have  seen  produce  the  like  of that 
which  we  aim  at; and  from  the  thought  of that,  the  thought  of means  to  that  mean;  and  so 
continually,  till we  come  to  some  beginning  within  our own  power  (Thomas  Hobbes, 
Leviathan,  Chapter  III,  quoted  in Polya,  1981[ 19621, p. 22). 
We  begin  from  where  we  want  to  go.  We  want  to  arrive  at A.  B would  be  a suitable  means  for 
attaining  A.  How  might  we  get  to  B?  C would  be a suitable  means  for  attaining  B,  and  so  on, 
until  we  arrive  at “some  beginning  within  our  own  power,”  E.  Employing  the  regressive 
procedure,  we  have  worked  backwards  from  our  goal  to  our  present  state.  This  was  the  analysis, 
the  plan.  Now  the  execution  of the  plan  may  commence,  workingforward  from  our  present  state 
along  the  path  we  have  outlined  via  our  analysis.  Thus,  in “translating  the  ideas  into  action”  we 
begin  from  where  we  are  at, E,  moving  to  D to  C to  B and  finally  to  A, arriving  finally  at the 
desired  end-state,  the  place  in which  we  began  our  analysis,  and  completed  our  synthesis. 
“Observe,”  Polya  urges,  “planning  and  executiorl  proceed  in opposite  directions”  (Polya, 
1981[ 19621, p. 23,  emphasis  added).  In planning,  we  begin  with  A and  end  with  E;  in executing 
the  plan,  we  begin  with  E and  end  with  A: “the  aim is the  first thing  we  thought  of and  the  last 
thing  we  laid hands  on”  (Polya,  198 1[ 19621, p. 23). 
The  question  arises  in the  context  of Lowe’s  instrumentalism:  what  if there  is no  path 
connecting  A, our goal(s), back to E,  our  present  state?  The  answer  depends  on where  the  snag 
4 arises.  We  recall  that  in Lowe’s  instrumentalism,  we  begin  with  an independently  given  vision  of 
the  desired  end-state:  some  politically  stipulated  goal  or  set  of goals.  “Instrumental  inference”  or 
“instrumental  analysis”  refers  to  the  regressive  procedure  by which  we  “work  backwards”  from 
that  vision.  First,  the  technical  means  by which  such  a state  may  be  achieved  must  be identified. 
If this  is where  the  snag  is, i.e.,  if the  goal  is not  technically  or physically  possible  given  present 
technology  and  knowledge,  then  it will be necessary  to  substitute  A’ for  A.  Long  term  strategies 
might  include  diverting  or  encouraging  the  diversion  of resources  into  research  and  development 
for  finding  technical  means  for  attaining  A. 
Once  a technical  means  has been  identified,  however,  the  next  step  is that  suitable 
behavior  for  the  setting  of such  a technical  process  in motion  must  be  discovered,  followed  by the 
uncovering  of  suitable  motivations  capable  of inducing  that  behavior.  Technical  feasibility  implies 
behavioral  feasibility  in the  physical  sense,  i.e.,  if there  were  an insurmountable  obstacle  in terms 
of human  labor  in physical  terms,  this  would  show  up  at the  previous  level.  The  only  obstacle  at 
the  behavioral  level  then  would  concern  social  acceptability.  However,  since  Lowe  posits 
individual  freedom  as a necessary  member  of any  set  of goals,  socially  unacceptable  behavioral 
requirements  would  be ruled  out  as inconsistent  with  any imaginable  A (where  A =  {A,, AZ,  A3 
,,,A,,}, and  A  = individual  freedom).  Likewise,  reasonable  conceivable  suitable  motivations  for 
inducing  suitable  behaviors  would  be limited  only  by their  social  acceptability. 
We  now  reach  the  point  of considering  the  environmental  and  institutional  context(s) 
capable  of eliciting  suitable  motivations.  If this  context  is not  E, i.e.,  the  presently  existing  state, 
then  policies  must  be implemented  which  would  transform  E into  E’,  where  E’ = suitable 
environmental  and  institutional  context(s)  capable  of inducing  the  suitable  motivations.  It may  be 
determined  that  there  is no  path  connecting  E to  A, but  we  are presently  at E and  we  must  get  to 
5 A.  Thus  we  find  a path  connecting  A back  to  E’, where  we  may  transform  E into  E’ through 
some  policy  or  set  of policies. 
III 
Though  Polya  has  probably  done  the  most  to  unearth  the  historical  use  of the  regressive 
method,  he  does  not  appear  to  be aware  of Peirce’s  work  in this  area,  nor  Aristotle’s  contribution. 
Peirce’s  terms  “abduction”  and  “retroduction”  are his translations  of Aristotle’s  “c~~clyoyq,”  a 
third  type  of inference  other  than  deduction  and  induction,  discussed  in the  2nd  Volume  ofPrior 
Analytics  (Hanson,  1958,  pp.  85, 200n4;  Farm,  1970,  p.  30).2 
Peirce  believes  there  are three  types  of inferences:  deduction,  induction,  and  retroduction. 
For  Peirce,  retroduction  is the  only  kind  of inference  that  actually  can  create  new  knowledge. 
Hanson  (1965,  p. 46)  finds  the  following  distinction  useful: 
1) reasons  for  accepting  some  hypothesis  H 
2) reasons  for  entertaining  some  hypothesis  H 
Retroduction  concerns  the  second;  it is about  hypothesis  formulation  and  selection,  rather  than 
about  rejecting  or accepting  some  already  formulated  hypothesis.  Retroduction  is complementary 
to  deduction  and  induction,  but  retroduction  “is the  first  step  in scientific  reasoning.“3  Once  an 
hypothesis  is adopted,  the  next  step  for  Peirce  is “to  trace  out  its necessary  and  probable..  . 
2 Peirce’s  writings  are voluminous  and  fragmentary  and there  is some  relatively  minor 
disagreement  over  whether  Peirce  meant  precisely  the  same  thing  by abduction  and  retroduction. 
Some  use  the  terms  “retroduction”  and  “abduction,”  as well  as terms  Peirce  used  in his earlier 
work  such  as “presumption,”  “hypothesis,”  and  “hypothetic  inference,”  to  mean  roughly  the  same 
thing(Fann,  1970,  p.  5n19).  Others  make  a distinction  between  abduction  and  retroduction  (e.g., 
see  Rescher,  1978,  p.  3; Tillers  and  Schum,  1991,  pp.  986ff.). 
3 See  Fann,  1970,  p.  35. 
6 consequences.  This  step  is deduction”  (Peirce,  7.203)4.  The  next  step  is to  compare  the  actual 
results  with  what  was  expected,  that  is, induction. 
Likewise,  Lowe  also  sees  a role  for  deductive  and  inductive  reasoning  as complementing 
instrumental  reasoning.  And  likewise,  deduction  and  induction  must  necessarily  follow  from  the 
instrumental  procedure.  It is through  instrumental  reasoning  that  suitable  policies  are  discovered, 
policies  that  will recreate  the  conditions  under  which  deductive  reasoning  may  take  place.  It is 
this  to  which  Lowe  refers  when  he  speaks  of the  “restoration  of deduction”  (1992,  p.  326).  But 
Lowe  calls this  instrumental-deduction  because  the  conditions  are  not  given  but  must  be 
encouraged  through  policy.  Lowe  states  that  just  as in the  case  of induction,  instrumental  findings 
are  only  accepted  provisionally,  remaining  plausible  until  empirically  confirmed  (1992,  p.  327). 
Peirce  and  Hanson  disagree  with  the  common  view  that  there  is no  “logic  of  scientific 
discovery.”  For  Peirce,  retroduction  is not  bogged  down  by rules,  but  it does  have  a logical  form 
(5.189): 
The  surprising  fact  C is observed. 
If A were  true,  C would  be a matter  of course. 
Hence  there  is reason  to  suspect  that  A is true. 
Peirce  refers  to  retroduction  as reasoning  from  consequent  to  antecedent,  or inferring  a cause 
from  its effect.’  Lowe’s  instrumentalism  similarly  works  backward,  but  from  an desired  future  to 
the  present,  rather  than  from  an observed  present  to  the  past 
Hanson,  following  Peirce,  has  investigated  the  difference  between  retroductive  and 
4 Peirce  scholarship  uses  this.form  for  citation.  The  number  to  the  left  of the  period  indicates  the 
volume  number  in Peirce’s  Collected  Works; the  number  to  the  right  indicates  the  page  number  of 
that  volume. 
5 See  Farm,  1970,  p.  15.  Recent  investigations  of abduction  in work  on  artificial  intelligence  and 
computer-based  logic  may  also  assist  in elaborating  the  potential  contributions  of the  notion  to 
policy-formulation  generally,  and  Lowe’s  instrumentalism  in particular.  See,  e.g.,  Boutilier  and 
Becher,  1995;  Eiter  and  Gottlob,  1995. 
7 deductive  reasoning  to  highlight  both  that  there  is a logic  to  retroduction,  and  that  its logic  is 
distinctive.  One  scientist  argues  from  premises  A, B,  C and  hypothesis  H to  conclusion  D 
Another  encounters  the  anomaly  D,  and  “cojoins  this  statement  with  A, B,  and  C so  as to  ‘corner’ 
an hypothesis  H which,  when  bracketed  with  A, B,  and  C will possibly  ‘explain’  D.  Both 
scientists  have  been  arguing,  both  have  been  using  their  brains.  Differently!”  (1965,  p.  64). 
Whether  one  works  the  problem  from  the  bottom  up  or from  the  top  down,  the  question  is 
whether  there  is a route  connecting  A,B,C  with  D.  The  logical  form  of the  argument  once  we 
have  worked  backwards  to  the  beginning  looks  the  same:  some  logical  route  connects  A, B,  C, H 
with  D.  We  can  state  this  regardless  of whether  we  have  arrived  at this  state  via progressive 
reasoning  from  A, B,  C, H to  D or regressive  reasoning  from  D back  to  A, B,  C, H.  Likewise, 
Hanson  argues,  if no  route  connects  A, B,  C, and  H to  D then  neither  retroduction  from  D nor 
hypothetic  deduction  from  A, B,  C, H will be forthcoming  (1965,  p.  58).  But,  he insists,  the  “de 
facto  conceptual  development  within  the  problem  solving  context...are  different”  in the  two  cases 
“and  not  only  psychologically  so!”  (1965,  p.  61). 
These  are  issues  which  are  crucial  for  Lowe’s  instrumentalism.  They  also  address  the 
criticisms  of those,  like  Machlup  (1969)  and Nagel(1969)  who  reject  Lowe’s  claim  that 
Instrumental  reasoning  cannot  be reduced  to  conventional  procedures.  Nagel,  for  example, 
writes: 
Except  for  the  fact  that  the  sequential  orders  in which  statements  are  derived  in regressive 
and  progressive  procedures  are generally  different,  it is not  evident  that  the  logic  of the 
two  procedures  is different.  A similar  remark  applies  to  instrumental  and  hypothetico- 
deductive  reasoning  in economics  (Nagel,  1969,  p. 64). 
Insight  into  a key  difference  is provided  by Hanson: 
From..&  B,  C, H,  any two  result[s]...(e.g.,  D,  and  D,)  must  themselves  be  consistent. 
Whereas,  given  any two  sets  of premisses-  A, B, C, H as against  A’,  B’,  C’, H’-  either  of 
which  may  resolve...D,  it is not  the  case  that  these  need  be mutually  consistent  (1965,  p. 
8 61). 
The  point  is to  get  to  D.  Working  backward  from  D, we  may  find  a number  of routes,  say A, B, 
C + H,  or H,  or H,,  where  there  is no needfor  the alternative  Hs  to be mutually  consistent-  they 
are  alternative  suitable  paths(Hanson,  1965:  60-61).  Working  forward  from  A, B,  C + H,  all the 
members  of the  attainable  set D1,2,3,,,n  must  be mutually  consistent;  there  may  be better  paths,  but 
we  will  not  find  them  working  forward:  we  may  not  find  a suitable  path,  or we  may  not  find  the 
best  suitable  path. 
Moreover,  Lowe  stresses  that  it is through  the h~strumentalprocedure  that  we discover 
the Hs  themselves: 
If it is true  that  engineering  rules  are indispensable  data  for  instrumental  analysis,  why 
bother  with  a regressive  derivation  of the  suitable  path  instead  of deducing  them  in the 
usual  fashion  from  the  knowledge  of these  rules  and  the  initial  conditions?  The  answer 
simple.  Once  we  know  which  members  of the  total  set  of engineering  rules  are goal- 
adequate,  we  can  indeed  deduce  the  path  in the  conventional  manner.  Thefirst  step  of 
instrumental  analysis  is to provide  us with precisely  this  knowledge  (1969,  p.  183). 
is 
It is to  this  issue  that  we  know  turn,  continuing  to  mine  the  insights  of Peirce  and  Polya,  as well  as 
those  of Michael  Polanyi,  to  elucidate  and  elaborate  the  “search  procedure”  of instrumental 
inference. 
IV 
Lowe  often  stressed  the  difficulty  of expressing  the  “procedure  of instrumental  analysis  in 
abstract  methodological  terms”(  1977[ 19651, p.  145).  The  difficulty  stems  partially  from  the  fact 
that,  according  to  Lowe,  there  are no  “formal  precepts”  of regressive  inference  (ibid.). 
Instrumental  inference  is characterized  by Lowe  as a “search  procedure”  and  “a mental  technique 
of problem-solving”  in which  solutions  are “discovered”  or “hit upon..  .through  what  Polanyi  calls a logical  ‘leap”’  (ibid.)?  “But  they  are not  leaps  in the  dark...[O]ur  search  is guided  by past 
experience,  analogies,  and  other  clues.  Yet  it remains  true  that  our  ultimate  insight  springs  from  a 
non-rational  act  of  ‘imagination”’  (1992,  p. 327). 
Retroductive  inference  or heuristics  seems  beset  by the  contradiction:  on the  one  hand, 
word  such  as “guess, ” “instinct”  and  “imagination”  are invoked  to  discuss  the  process,  while  on 
the  other  hand  it is insisted  that  there  is a “logic”  of scientific  discovery.  Lowe  believed  that 
although  “no  one  has  as yet  worked  out  the  detailed  steps,”  his work  on  instrumental  inference  “in 
action”  was  a contribution  toward  “elaborat[ing]  the  logic  of the  procedure”  (Vickers,  1991,  p. 
60).  The  remainder  of this  section  will attempt  to  elaborate  the  search  procedure  at a more 
abstract  methodological  level.  We  have  seen  that  Lowe  did believe  the  overlooked  work  of 
Polanyi,  Polya,  Peirce,  and  Hanson  were  important  contrAtiU .  :hr+ons  in the  area.  Thus  aspects  of 
their  work  may  be mined,  with  the  intention  of highlighting  the  potential  contributions  of Lowe’s 
instrumentalism  to  the  practical  activity  of policy  formulation. 
In Lowe’s  view,  heuristic  principles  “are  really the  source  of all scientific  knowledge,  and 
are unlikely  to  be  displaced  by even  the  most  sophisticated  computer”  (1969,  p.  184).  Some  light 
may  be  shed  on  this  topic,  as well  as the  difficulty  of dealing  with  these  issues  in abstract  terms, 
through  Michael  Polanyi’s  distinction  between  two  different  types  of knowledge  (1958;  1959; 
1966).  By “explicit  knowledge”  Polanyi  refers  to  knowledge  that  is articulate,  that  which  is 
usually  intended  by the  word  “knowledge,”  that  is, written  words,  mathematical  formulae,  maps, 
etc.  (1959,  p.  12).  But  Polanyi  identifies  “tacit  knowledge”  as the  “dominant  principle  of all 
knowledge”  which  “at all mental  levels...[is]  decisive”  (I  959,  pp.  13,  19).  Tacit  knowledge  is 
“unformulated”;  it is the  “knowledge  we  have  of something  we  are in the  act  of doing”  (1959,  p. 
6  See  also  1977:  332;  1992:  327. 
10 12).  Explicit  knowledge  can be  critically  reflected  upon,  which  is an advantage  that  it has  over 
tacit  knowledge  (1959,  pp.  15-18).  Yet  tacit  knowledge  concerns  discovery,  which  is the  basis 
for  explicit  knowledge.  As Polanyi  puts  it, a traveller  with  a detailed  map  enjoys  superiority  over 
the  explorer  who  first  enters  a new  region:  “yet  the  explorer’s  fumbling  progress  is a much  finer 
achievement  than  the  well-briefed  traveller’s  journey”  (1959,  p.  18).  Or,  put  another  way: 
“Even  if we  admitted  that  an exact  knowledge  of the  universe  was  our  supreme  mental 
possession,  it would  still follow  that  our  most  distinguished  act  of thought  consists  in producing 
such  knowledge”  (1959,  p.  18). 
Because  of its nature,  the  “way  of discovery”  (Gelwick,  1977)  is difficult  to  explicate. 
Polya  has thus  identified  the  “first  task”  as that  of “collect[ing]  and  classifjl[ing]  such  problem 
solving  procedures”  and  to  “develop  a repertory  of problem  solving  techniques”  (1984[  19711, p. 
590).  This  will not  solve  the  issue  comprehensively,  however,  because  there  remains  the  issue  of 
choosing  from  among  the  available  techniques,  a decision  which  will require  that  the  investigator 
“use  personal  judgement,  as Polanyi  would  say”  (ibid.).  This  is similar  to  Lowe’s  discussion  of 
choosing  among  alternative  hypotheses: 
there  are no  binding  rules,  according  to  which  a researcher  could  decide  in favour  of  one 
among  many  possible  hypotheses.  Which  one  he chooses  in the  end,  adopting...  Einstein’s 
‘free  creation  of the  mind’,  is neither  a strictly  determinable  nor  an arbitrary  decision 
(1992,  p.  327). 
Polya  and  Polanyi  have  both  contributed  to  the  challenge  of explicating  the  procedures  of 
the  inexplicable.  Whereas  Polya’s  efforts  have  been  more  along  the  lines  of taking  an inventory  of 
tools,  Polanyi  has  explored  the  tacit  fringes  of these  procedures.  For  Polanyi,  appreciation  of  a 
problem  is itself  part  of the  act  of discovery  (Polanyi,  1958,  p.  121).  Seeing  a problem  “is a 
definite  addition  to  our  knowledge,”  and  “to  recognize  a problem  that  can be  solved  and  worth 
solving  is a discovery  in its own  right”  (1958,  p.  120).  In the  process  of grappling  with  a 
11 problem,  a “heuristic  stress”  builds,  which  is akin to  an emotional  strain  on  the  part  of the 
investigator.  Discovery  leads  to  a release,  e.g.,  running  through  the  streets  crying 
“Eureka!“(1958,  p.  122). 
One  heuristic  tactic  noted  by Polanyi  is to  continuously  reorganize  the  problem  “with  a 
view  to  eliciting  some  new  suggestive  aspects  of it” (1958,  p.  128).  This  is reminiscent  of C. 
Wright  Mills’  suggestion  that  “the  re-arranging  of the  [researcher’s]  file.. .is one  way  to  invite  the 
[sociological]  imagination”(  1959,  p. 2 12): 
Imagination  is often  successfidly  invited  by putting  together  hitherto  isolated  items,  by 
finding  unsuspecting  connections...As  you  re-arrange  a filing  system,  you  often  find  that 
you  are,  as it were,  loosening  your  imagination.  Apparently  this  occurs  by means  of your 
attempt  to  combine  various  ideas  and  notes  on  different  topics.  It is a sort  of logic  of 
combination,  and  ‘chance’  sometimes  plays  a curiously  large  part  in it.  In  a relaxed  way, 
you  try  to  engage  your  intellectual  resources...Of  course,  you  will  have  in mind  the  several 
problems  on  which  you  are  actively  working,  but  you  will also  try  to  be passively  receptive 
to  unforeseen  and  unplanned  linkages  (1959,  pp.  201,212). 
Both  Polanyi  and  Mills  relate  this  “reorganizing”  tactic  with  another,  what  Polanyi  refers  to  as 
“ransack[ing]  our  memory  for  any  similar  problem”  (1958,  p,  128) and  Mills  calls “get[ting]  a 
comparative  grip  on the  materials”  (1959,  p. 215,  original  emphasis).  This  is actually  what  Polya 
was  referring  to  in the  story  about  the  person  trying  to  cross  the  creek  when  he  stated  that  “the 
man  may  recall  he  has  crossed  some  other  creek  by walking  across  a fallen  tree”  (1957[  19451, p 
145)  and  also  what  Hobbes  points  to  when  he writes  that  “from  desire  ariseth  the  thought  of some 
means  we have  seen produce  the like  of  that  which  we aim  at” (Polya,  198 1 [ 19621, p.  2, emphasis 
added),  i.e.,  we  are familiar  with  an analogous  problem  that  has been  solved: 
Any  conjecture,  of course,  must  have  been  suggested..  .by somehow  related  ideas  (special 
cases,  analogies,  etc.),  although,  perhaps,  at the  moment  of conceiving  the  conjecture 
those  ideas  were  not  clearly  and  explicitly  present  (Polya,  1984[1948],  p. 474). 
Polya  distinguishes  “similarity”  from  “analogy”  as two  related  but  distinct  heuristic 
tools(l984[  19481).  Thus  we  can  begin  to  appreciate  what  Lowe  means  when  he writes  that  in 
12 seeking  to  discover  the  suitable  path  or paths  to  the  realization  of a given  macro  goal  or  goals, 
“our  search  is guided  by past  experience,  analogies,  and  other  clues”  (1992,  p.  327). 
In the  course  of the  heuristic  search,  we  must  look  for  “favorable  signs,”  which  of course 
must  not  be  mistaken  for  “proof,”  but  which  encourage  “further  investigation”(Polya, 
1984[ 19491, p. 490).  Lowe  as well  cautions  that  “the  findings  of heuristic  analysis  can  be 
accepted  only  provisionally”(  1992,  p.  327).  Polya  invokes  the  notions  of the  “bright  idea”  and 
“feeling  we  are  ‘on the  right  track”’  to  get  at the  seemingly  intuitive  aspects  of the  discovery 
procedure(ibid.).  For  Polanyi,  “success  depends  ultimately  on the  capacity  for  sensing  the 
presence  of yet  unrevealed  logical  relations  between  conditions  of the  problem,  the  theorems 
known..  ., and  the  unknown  solution..  .”  (1958,  p.  128).  Polanyi  invokes  the  “common 
experience(s)  of groping  for  a forgotten  name”  and  searching  for  a name  or word  that  is said to  be 
“on  the  tip  of the  tongue”  to  illustrate  the  “sense  of growing  proximity  to  the  solution”  that  guides 
discovery  (1958,  pp.  128-29).  As Lowe  puts  it, the  “researcher  ‘senses’  a structural  relationship 
between  the  hypothesis  he  chooses  and  the  problem  he wants  to  solve”  (1992,  p.  327). 
Equally  important  is Polanyi’s  suggestion  that  self-awareness  of the  capacity  to  sense  the 
“accessibility  of a hidden  inference,”  as well  as of the  ability to  “invent  transformations  of the 
premisses  which  would  increase  accessibility”  is a “foreknowledge”  which  itself  “biases  our 
guesses  in the  right  direction”  (1958,  p.  129).  The  discovery-enhancing  effects  of our  awareness 
of our  ability  to  discover  is also  related  by Polanyi  to  the  fact  that  “a set  purpose  may 
automatically  result  in action  later  on”  as when  we  go  to  bed  resolved  to  wake  up  at a certain 
hour,  and  then  actually  do  (1958,  p.  129).  These  factors  also  help  explain  the  “self-accelerating 
manner  of final  stages  of  solution”,  i.e.,  the  closer  we  get  the  faster  we  progress  (1958,  p.  129). 
These  aspects  of discovery  are  not  treated  lightly  by Polanyi,  who  takes  the  position  that  “the 
13 whole  process  of discovery  and  confirmation  ultimately  relies  on  our  own  crediting  of our  own 
vision”  (1958,  p.  130). 
Peirce  also  believed  that  abductive  reasoning  was  “a skill that  could  be improved  by 
practice  or  discipline”  (Ochs,  1993,  p.  61).  Like  Polya,  Polanyi,  and  Mills,  Peirce  sees  a vital  role 
for  “common-sense,”  a view  that  has  points  of contact  with  Schutz  as well  (Schutz,  1967[ 19531). 
To  this  must  be  added  the  value  of imagination  in making  discoveries.7  The  difference  is that  in 
Lowe’s  instrumentalism,  it is not  a mathematical  proof  that  is being  sought,  but  suitable  paths  to 
desired  macro-outcomes  and  suitable  policies  for  creating  contexts  capable  of  steering  the  system 
onto  such  a path. 
It must  be emphasized  again  that  all the  authors  referred  to  here  are  of the  opinion  that 
these  processes  are  complementary  to  the  generally  recognized  procedures  of  scientific  practice. 
But  the  point  is that  these  processes  are  crucial  and  indispensable,  and  recognition  of this 
increases  their  power. 
In  a sense,  then,  instrumentalism  is not  “new”:  Lowe  describes  implicit  procedures  and 
tactics  of problem  solving  that  are “taken-for-granted.”  To  the  extent  that  these  general 
tendencies  are  not  explicitly  taboo,  Lowe’s  call is for  making  these  procedures  conscious  and 
V 
recognizing  their  potential  contribution  to  enhancing  the  power  and  success  of the  planning  and 
policy-formulating  processes. 
Lowe’s  proposition  that  instrumental  inference  may  greatly  improve  the  efficacy  of policy 
and  planning  is relevant  to  recent  discussions  that  have  taken  place  in the  post-Soviet  era.  First,  it 
’  Cf. Lowe,  1992,  p.  327. 
14 is relevant  to  the  recent  Austrian  emphasis  on the  “knowledge  problem”  as the  basis  for 
understanding  both  the  collapse  of  Soviet-style  systems  and the  theoretical  issues  regarding  the 
“socialist  calculation  debate”  (Lavoie,  1985).  Specifically,  understanding  and  elaboration  of 
Lowe’s  method  for  policy  and  planning  precisely  addresses  some  of the  key  Austrian  arguments 
against  government  intervention.  Second,  and  relatedly,  the  interpretation  of instrumentalism 
being  offered  here  has  points  of contact  with  and  may  contribute  toward  the  project  of 
formulating  an alternative  approach  to  ‘rational  planning.’ 
The  socialist  calculation  debate  was  not  about  capitalism  versus  socialism:  it was  about 
whether  neoclassical  general  equilibrium  analysis  could  be the  basis  of socialist  central  planning.8 
Lange  and  Lemer  said yes;  Mises  and  Hayek  said no.  The  Mises  and  Hayek  argument  has  been 
developed  into  what  is now  referred  to  as the  “knowledge  problem”  (Lavoie,  1985,  ch.  3). 
Interestingly,  Polanyi’s  notion  of “tacit  knowledge’  is used  to  make  the  argument  against  the 
efficacy  of planning  (Lavoie,  1985), whereas  here  we  are viewing  Polanyi’s  work,  in its usefulness 
in explicating  and  elaborating  Lowe’s  instrumental  inference,  as a potential  contribution  to 
planning.’ 
The  Austrians  are  right  to  emphasize  issues  of knowledge.  They  are wrong--logically 
inconsistent--in  singling  out  policy  formulators  as uniquely  exempt  from  employing  “tacit  powers” 
in their  own  work.  Why  is it that  everyone,  including  scientists,  have  tremendous  powers  of 
creative  discovery...everyone,  that  is, except  planners?  As Lowe  has  demonstrated,  the  policy- 
formulator  and  planner  as well--or  even  especially--may  draw  on the  great  resources  provided  by 
* See  Kirzner,  1988;  Ruccio,  1992. 
9 Donald  Winch,  writing  in his review  of On Economic Knowledge  that  “the  charges  of 
‘scientism’  used  originally  by Hayek  and  others  to  attack  planning  are  here  inverted  to  provide 
support  for  a dirigiste  position,”  is apparently  the  only  person  who  has  commented  (and  that  in 
passing)  on this  general  aspect  of Lowe’s  work  (1967,  p.  861). 
15 regressive  inference. 
Lavoie  (1985,  p.  5 l),  opens  his chapter  on the  “Knowledge  Problem”  quoting  Lachmann: 
The  business  man  who  forms  an expectation  is doing  precisely  what  a scientist  does  when 
he formulates  a working  hypothesis.  Both  business  expectations  and  scientific  hypotheses 
serve  the  same  purpose;  both  reflect  an attempt  at cognition  and  orientation  in an 
imperfectly  known  world,  both  embody  imperfect  knowledge  to  be tested  and  improved 
by later  experience  (Lachmann,  1978,  p. 23,  quoted  in ibid.). 
This  describes  the  same  world  recognized  by Lowe  as that  which  the  instrumental  analyst  faces. 
Why  then  cannot  the  tasks  of policy  formulators  and  planners  be described  in a similar  fashion? 
Why  may  scientists  employ  these  creative  implicit  powers  in their  invention,  but  not  those  who 
formulate  policy?  What  about  scientists  who  are employed  by the  government?  Are  scientists 
employed  at private  universities  capable  of tacit  powers  of discovery  that  those  at  State  schools 
are not?” 
Will planners  be wrong  sometimes?  Of course,  just  as “entrepreneurs”  and  “scientists”  are 
often  wrong.  As Robin  Blackburn  has  recently  pointed  out,  the  Austrian  argument  about 
“dispersed  knowledge”  can be used  to  argue  that  only  workers  and  not  capitalists  could 
effectively  manage  production  (1991,  p. 36).  Are  the  impacts  of entrepreneurial  mistakes  slight 
relative  to  those  of planners?  By  no  means.  Some  entrepreneurial  mistakes  are very  costly  to 
society,  as are  some  entrepreneurial  successes.  There  is simply  no  logical  reason  to  exclude 
planners  and  policy  formulators  from  the  rest  of humanity.  Is there  corruption?  Of course,  just  as 
lo Elsewhere,  Lachmann  calls the  “concept  of  ‘plan’. . .  a Cmdamental  hermeneutic  notion”,  and 
states  that  it “will have  to  be introduced  into  the  theory  of consumption”,  asking:  “If firms  can 
make  plans,  why  not  households”(  1991,  p.  145).  And  why,  we  must  ask,  not  other  social  groups, 
such  as neighborhoods,  communities,  cities,  states,  nations,  or regions?  As Vietorisz  reminds  us, 
planning,  as an “exercise  of  social  intent...shares  the  characteristics  of all deliberate  action...all 
deliberate  human  action  aims  in part  at social  effects”  (1983,  pp.  473-74).  The  Austrian 
dichotomous  treatment  of “market”  and  “state”  activities  on these  grounds  simply  does  not  hold 
UP. 
16 there  is corruption  in the  private  sector. 
The  Austrian  emphasis  on  the  knowledge  problem  is a valid  and  important  critique  of 
planning  based  on  a narrow  view  of “rationality.”  But  Lowe’s  work  suggests  that  planning,  or 
policy  formulation,  can be thought  of as kind  of discovery  procedure  as well.  In fact,  Lowe  is not 
alone  in this  regard.  A number  of alternatives  to  “rational”  or “optimal’  planning  have  been 
developed  which  criticize  the  essentialist  and  technocratic  nature  of traditional  central  planning. 
Aspects  of “mixed-scanning,”  “general  systems,”  and  “learning-adaptive”  approaches  provide  a 
number  of helpful  insights  into  strengthening  the  ways  in which  collective  problems  requiring 
meaningful  attention  may  be  addressed.”  Many  in the  Marxian/socialist  tradition  have  also 
rejected  the  dichotomous  “market  vs.  plan”  view.12 
Not  surprisingly,  “postmodern  planning”  can  also be located,  though  (equally 
unsurprisingly)  the  term  is used  by different  authors  to  express  a wide  variety  of views.13 
Amariglio  and  Ruccio  reject  the  “totalizing  promise  of rational  centralized  planning”  as 
“modernist”  (1995,  p. 22).  Postmodern  planning  explicitly  acknowledges  uncertainty,  and  that 
the  planning  process  “will always  be marked  by the  mediation  of different  knowledges  and 
subjectivities”;  its results  are  expected  to  be,  and  so are treated  as, provisional  and  contingent 
(ibid.).  The  po in s o  contact  between  aspects  of these  alternative  approaches  to  planning  and  t  f 
instrumentalism  are  evident.  These  attempts  may  gain  much  from  the  work  begun  by Lowe,  just 
as extensions  and  elaborations  of instrumentalism  may  benefit  from  these  recent  explorations. 
l1 See,  e.g.,  Wilson,  1980;  Los,  1981. 
l2 See,  e.g.,  Ruccio,  1992. 
I3 See,  e.g.,  Dear,  1986;  1989;  Ryan,  1982;  Cooper  and  Burrell,  1988 
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This  paper  has  attempted  to  take  a first  step  in elaborating  some  aspects  of Lowe’s 
instrumentalism  that  have  not  received  much,  if any,  attention.  It is clear  that  Lowe  believed 
instrumentalism  to  be a distinct  approach  to  policy  formulation  with  significant  advantages  over 
traditional  approaches.  While  Lowe  made  passing  references  to  the  ideas  of others  which  he 
believed  had  family  resemblances  to  his conception  of instrumental  inference,  he  did  not  himself 
explore  these  connections  in any  detail.  Further  work  along  these  lines  may  assist  in elaborating 
Lowe’s  hints  in ways  that  may  prove  constructive  in the  task  of refining  and  improving  the 
effectiveness  of policy  formulation  and  planning. 
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